Embodying movies: embodied simulation and film experience by Gallese, Vittorio
  183 
EMBODYING MOVIES: 
EMBODIED SIMULATION AND FILM STUDIES 
Vittorio Gallese (University of Parma) 
Michele Guerra (University of Parma) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Film is an art, thus expressing one of the most distinctive features of what makes us 
human. Film is a possible target of investigation for cognitive neuroscience, and for 
a variety of very good reasons. First, because like all forms of art it exemplifies a 
mediated form of intersubjectivity where the film is the mediator between the film’s 
creator and film’s viewers.1 Second, because watching a movie exemplifies a type of 
perception whose relationship with “natural” perception is still hotly debated. 
Third, because like other kinds of artistic expression, film enables us to study one of 
the many possible fictional worlds we inhabit, thus tapping into the crucial problem 
of the relationship between the “real” and the “virtual,” between the prosaic world 
we inhabit in our daily occupations and the imaginary worlds of artistic fiction. 
 “How can cinema have so powerful a ‘reality effect’ when it is so manifestly 
unreal?” We would like to start by reinstating Steven Shaviro’s2 question against the 
background of the new take cognitive neuroscience proposes on embodiment and 
applying it to film studies. This “reality effect” represents one of the most 
challenging issues within the debate of film since its origins. Recent studies within 
cognitive film theory, visual psychology and neuroscience bring out strong evidence 
of a continuity between perceiving scenes in movies and in the world, as the 
dynamics of attention, spatial cognition and action are very similar in direct 
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experience and mediated experience. We can count on a huge literature on this 
topic.3 Thanks to new technologies like fMRI, eye-tracking or other statistical 
analyses, we can widen the field of our cognitive approach to film theory,4 also 
considering that usually neuroscientists base some of their experiments on filmed 
scenes.5  
Since we are interested in tapping into such a debate from a motor perspective, 
our analysis will be based on Embodied Simulation (ES) theory6. ES has been 
proposed to constitute a basic functional mechanism of humans’ brain, by means of 
which actions, emotions and sensations of others are mapped onto the observer’s 
own sensory-motor and viscero-motor neural representations. Such theory was 
triggered by the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey brain.7 Mirror 
neurons are motor neurons that typically discharge both when a motor act is 
executed and when it is observed being performed by someone else. The functional 
properties of mirror neurons (mirror mechanism, MM) characterize a parieto-
premotor cortical network.  Thus, observing an action causes in the observer the 
activation of the same neural mechanism that is triggered by executing that action 
oneself. 
After two decades of research it is established that a similar MM is also present 
in the human brain8. The MM for actions in humans is somatotopically organized; 
the parieto-premotor cortical regions normally active when we execute mouth-, 
hand-, and foot-related acts are also activated when observing the same motor acts 
executed by others. Watching someone grasping a beer mug, biting an apple, or 
kicking a football activates the same cortical regions normally activated when 
actually executing the same actions. Further brain imaging studies showed that the 
MM also applies to emotions and sensations. Witnessing someone else expressing a 
given emotion like disgust or pain, or undergoing a given sensation like touch 
activates some of the viscero-motor (e.g., anterior insula) and sensory-motor (e.g., 
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SII, ventral premotor cortex) brain areas activated when one experiences the same 
emotion or sensation, respectively.9 Such shared activations ground an apparently 
external stimulus (someone else’s emotion or sensation) in our personal experiential 
acquaintance with the same emotion or sensation.10 
Summing up, according to ES theory our brain-body system re-uses part of its 
neural resources to map others’ behavior. When witnessing actions performed by 
others, we simulate them by activating our own motor system. Similarly, by 
activating other cortical regions we re-use our affective and sensory-motor neural 
circuits to map the emotional and somato-sensory experiences of others. By means 
of ES we have a direct access to the world of others. The MM, though, constitutes 
only one instantiation of ES.  
Object perception provides us with another example of ES in the action domain. 
Seeing a manipulable object selectively recruits the same motor resources typically 
employed during the planning and execution of actions targeting the same object. 
Several single neuron recording studies in monkeys and electrophysiological and 
brain imaging studies in humans demonstrated that neuronal populations in the 
premotor and posterior parietal cortex — canonical neurons — selectively activate 
both when grasping an object and merely perceiving it.11 The sight of a manipulable 
object, such as a key (see below), evokes a motor activation in the observer’s brain 
even in the absence of any overt motor behavior. Furthermore, when looking at an 
object the activation of grasping-related motor neural circuits can be affected by the 
same spatial constraints governing the execution of actual grasping actions. The 
power of an handled mug to afford a suitable grip has been shown to depend on its 
actual reachability, even when people do not act upon it, nor intend to do so.12 
Strikingly, spatial constraints affect the ES of one’s own potential actions even when 
observing someone else who is about to act upon the object.13 The perception of an 
object, through ES, can be nothing but a preliminary form of action, which 
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regardless of whether we actually interact with the object or not, gives it to us as 
something present-at-hand (zu-handen, in Heidegger’s terms14). This suggests that ES 
constitutively shapes the content of perception, characterizing the perceived object 
in terms of motor acts it may afford — even in the absence of any effective 
movement. 
A further instantiation of ES concerns the way the brain-body system maps the 
space surrounding our body, peri-personal space.15 Posterior parietal and premotor 
neurons, both in humans and monkeys, integrate visual and auditory information 
about objects within peri-personal space by mapping it onto the motor programs 
required to interact with those objects within that space. As envisaged by Merleau-
Ponty, “my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or 
possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like that 
of ‘spatial sensations’, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation.”16 The 
defining properties of peri-personal space consist in its being multisensory (i.e., 
based on the integration of visual, tactile, auditory and proprioceptive information), 
body-centered (encoded not in retinal, but in somatic coordinates), and motor in 
nature. Peri-personal space and its range can be construed, again quoting Merleau-
Ponty, as “the varying range of our aims and our gestures.”17 
As in the case of object perception, the ES-based action dependence of peri-
personal space does not involve the effective execution of movements, but it is 
revealed by the potentialities for action shaping the content of our perception of 
objects within reach even when we are not actually acting upon them. 
As recently shown by the Italian philosopher Mauro Carbone,18 Merleau-Ponty 
developed a theory of the perceiving body able to testify to the phenomenal truth of 
movement produced by the discontinuous images of cinema, by means of the 
movement projection performed by the observer. To paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, “If 
we now consider the film as a perceptual object, we can apply what we have just 
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said about perception in general to the perception of a film.”19 In the following 
sections we show the relevance of ES for film studies.  
 
 
2. WAITING FOR ES  
 
In the last twenty years we have been witnessing an increasing idea of continuity 
between the film and the viewer: we perceive the movie as well as we perceive the 
real world and both the movie and the world contact us primarily at an embodied 
level and then gradually at a “less wild” level of communication.20 Biocultural film 
studies emphasize this kind of access to film, stressing how we can experience 
movies by means of a brain-body system evolved in a totally different 
environment.21 As Deleuze said, “cinema not only puts movement in the image, it 
also puts movement in the mind […] I don’t believe that linguistics and 
psychoanalysis offer a great deal to the cinema. On the contrary, the biology of the 
brain does.”22 We should thus get back to the brain-body to grasp our primordial 
contact with the film and test the plausibility of some film theories.  
Deleuze made great use of brain metaphors, making sometimes difficult to 
understand the real meaning of terms like, for instance, “cinematic synapses”.23 
Martha Blassnigg gave us a good description of the usage of these metaphors within 
a French culture inspired by Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory, noticing that the 
analogy between the screen and the brain was put forward by Edgar Morin too, 
many years before Deleuze — who never cites him in his two cinema books.24 As 
Blassnigg writes, “Deleuze makes clear that the brain in a comparison with the 
screen is not to be understood as a purely cognitive faculty, and he foregrounds the 
importance of the involved emotive qualities.”25 In other words, Deleuze’s brain 
metaphors mark the passage toward a physical approach to film studies that after 
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the publication of his cinema books put — more or less consciously — the Grand 
Theory rooted in semiotics and psychoanalysis in a difficult position, foreseeing the 
advent of a biocultural approach to cinema. 
Bioculturalism actually seems to be the right way not only to challenge the 
Grand Theory, but also to update some insights from cognitive and 
phenomenological film studies, that have had the extraordinary merit of placing our 
brain-body system at the heart of film debate, even though demonstrating some 
resistances in considering the impact of cognitive neuroscience on such a debate. 
Nonetheless we would like to underline that we do not share the rigid 
condemnation of semiotics and psychoanalysis, nor of semiotic and psychoanalytic 
film theory; we know that the best contemporary semiotics and psychoanalysis — 
as well as the best semiotic and psychoanalitic film theory — are perfectly aware of 
the need to cope with the contribution of cognitive science and neuroscience. 
According to Shaviro, the cinematic apparatus is a new mode of embodiment 
and “there is no structuring lack, no primordial division, but a continuity between 
the physiological and affective responses of my own body and the appearances and 
disappearances, the mutations and the perdurances, of the bodies and images on the 
screen.”26  
This continuity is strictly tied to the mode of presence of cinema, i.e., to the 
impression we are inside the diegetic world, we experience the movie from a 
sensory-motor perspective and we behave “as if” we were experiencing a real life 
situation. Indeed Shaviro stresses that such a continuity is mainly detectable at the 
physiological and affective level, heightening the relevance of our pre-cognitive 
approach to film, the physicality of such experience and the priority of film affect.27 
Many years after the publication of his book, Shaviro reinforced his positions: “what 
I was groping towards, bit unable to express fully, was the idea that the cognitive — 
far from being opposed to the visceral or bodily — grows out of the visceral and is 
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an elaboration of it.”28 The “as if” component of our film experience implies two 
intertwined sides: one rooted in our brain-body and the other developing through 
our cognitive processes. From this point of view, Ghazanfar and Shepherd’s 
experiments with monkeys at the movies are very convincing.29  
The interaction between the film as a lived body and its viewer30 can go so far as 
to consider the movie as the crossroad of three different bodies: the body of the 
spectator, the body of the film, and the body of the filmmaker. MacDougall wrote 
that images we make are “in a sense mirrors of our bodies, replicating the whole of 
the body’s activity, with its physical movements, its shifting attention, and its 
conflicting impulses toward order and disorder. [...] Corporeal images are not just 
the images of our bodies; they are also images of the body behind the camera and its 
relations with the world.”31 The debated idea according to which the movie could be 
considered like a lived body has been convincingly discussed in Sobchack’s works, 
as she considers — referring to Umberto Eco — the “lived modes” of perceptual and 
sensory experience used by the cinema as “sign-vehicles of representation”.32 
However, there is a huge number of scholars considering the film as a lived entity, 
mainly because it moves.33 From our perspective, this kind of vitality is detectable as 
we think of the relationship between the movie and the viewer, since motion 
pictures, because of their own essence, entail a body able to decipher their 
movement by simulating it internally. Merleau-Ponty wrote that we can understand 
the movement only through the movement, that is, thanks to our own body 
“possibilités motrices”.34 
Filmmakers would be supposed to create, layer by layer, a living object sharing 
perceptual and cognitive structures with its viewer and they have to calibrate it 
according to a significantly different level of empathy. What is at stake is the 
embodied cognition of a new spatio-temporal dimension, and the only way to make 
it work is to establish a continuity between our embodied reality and our embodied 
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visions. The body becomes the starting point both for the filmmaker and for the 
viewer, recalling what Münsterberg suggested about the way our body adjusts itself 
in order to guarantee “the fullest possible impression.”35 As Grodal writes, basically 
Münsterberg “showed how the film experience might be described as a cued 
simulation of key mental and bodily functions,”36 stressing how important our 
brain-body responses are in order to behave correctly in this new spatio-temporal 
dimension. Jan Patočka put it very similarly, when he said that “the original spatial 
perspective within which we locate ourselves receives its orientation from the 
possibilities of our corporeal activity.”37  
We posit that ES, considered within this perspective, plays a crucial role not 
only at the receptive level, but also at the creative one, and this is the reason why 
filmmakers are generally interested much more than scholars in this new field of 
research, since they become aware of the basis of their “filmic cognition,” made 
mostly of gestures, actions, intentions and emotions inscribed in a space-time 
shaped by film style, camera movements and montage.  
Psychological research on visual properties, visual space and film has 
demonstrated the existence of a strong continuity between perceptual experience in 
film and the real world, revealing the importance of the body in shaping the film 
space and in “spatializing” objects and characters.38 We can posit that this is due to 
the fact that our brain serves primarily one purpose, moving us around, a crucial 
activity for our conceptual life too, if we agree with Turner saying that “the basic 
stories we know best are small stories of events in space,” or that our “image 
schemas are skeletal patterns that recur in our sensory and motor experience,” or 
again, referring to Eve Sweetser, that “the mind is a body moving through space.”39  
Although we mainly empathize with characters, it is self-evident, as Barker 
pointed out, that we respond to whole cinematic structures — textural, spatial and 
temporal — that resonate with our own textural, spatial and temporal structures.40 
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The PECMA flow (perception, emotion, cognition and motor action) put forward by 
Grodal refers basically to this kind of approach, grounding it on the general 
functional architecture of the brain. 
 
 
3. ES AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR FILM STUDIES 
 
Our point is that ES provides neurobiological grounding to this kind of 
interpersonal understanding involving the viewer’s body, the film as a lived body 
and the filmmaker’s body as well: this is why in making an experiment on film style 
we should also film the cameraman and his kinematics.41 These kinds of relations 
are marked by our bodily involvement, to be considered at the implicit and pre-
reflective level of intercorporeality ES conceives of.42 This is the first contact, without 
which we cannot have any access to higher cognitive levels, making clear that the 
intersubjectivity movies enhance relies on internal non-linguistic representations, 
where the term representation “refers to a particular type of content, generated by 
the relations that our situated and interacting brain-body system instantiates with 
the world of others.”43  
ES sheds new light on many insights film theorists, psychologists and even 
physicians have put forward in XX century. Think of the early experiments made in 
1920 by two French physicians, Edouard Touluse and Raoul Mourgue.44 Their work, 
entitled “Les réactions respiratoires au cours de projections cinématographiques,” 
aimed to show how stongly the movies affect the audience and how close the 
relationship between the movie and its viewer is. As Moussinac wrote five years 
after these experiments, “les docteurs Touluse and Mourgue établissent que, étant 
scientifiquement démontré que la perception du mouvement fait naître l’ébauche du 
mouvement correspondant, il se produirait à l’écran un phénomène du même genre 
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que la suggestion hypnotique pratiquée après avoir mis le sujet dans une attitude 
donnée.”45 Moussinac blends physiology and hypnosis but he suggests 
interpretations corroborated in recent years thanks to the discovery of MMs in 
humans.  
The physical effect of film was brought out by Benjamin, who wrote about the 
tactile (Taktisch) quality of film,46 and strongly condemned by Duhamel, who 
described in his 1930 Scène de la vie future film movement and rapidity as a means of 
impairing not only comprehension but also any form of participation47 — and 
Benjamin will refer to him in his The Work of Art in the Age of Technological 
Reproducibility. The same effect characterized, to some extent naively, primitive and 
pre-narrative movies, in which the central role played by the human body within 
the frame elicited this kind of mirror effect. Such a matter will be also discussed in 
the works of Soviet filmmakers like Kuleshov, Pudovkin, Vertov and Eisenstein both 
in their films and writings, where by means of a process of trial and error they were 
committed in bridging film language and human brain processing. The physical 
effect will be incorporated in the transparency of classical Hollywood montage, that 
to some extent tried to externalize our cognitive processes, then challenged by the 
so-called modern cinema, aiming to break the sensory-motor relationship between 
the viewer and the movie by changing the normal “affordances” a movie entailed. 
Nowadays we see how new technologies try to enhance a multisensory relation 
based on new forms of immersion and physical involvement.  
The central question is: How and at which level does the movie engage the 
viewer? Kracauer, perfectly in line with our assumption, would answer that the 
moving image engages the viewer “physiologically before he is in a position to 
respond intellectually” and it elicits “a ‘resonance effect’ provoking in the spectator 
such kinesthetic responses as muscular reflexes, motor impulses, or the like. In any 
case, objective movement acts as a physiological stimulus.”48 This is very close to 
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Michotte’s concept of “mouvement incipient,” by means of which “je sens ce que 
l’autre fait”49 — that is roughly the Italian title of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s Mirrors 
in the Brain: So quel che fai. 
The ES perspective may represent the basic link facilitating the convergence of 
high and low-level theories wished by Joseph and Barbara Anderson at the 
beginning of the “post-theory” era.50 ES can better explain the activity of the viewer 
as a “cinesthetic subject,”51 allowing us to cope with our subcognitive responses to 
film in a different and more elegant manner. ES can also shed new light on the 
“mode of presence” of cinema.52 Since ES is characterized by the capacity to share 
meaning of actions, basic motor intentions, feelings and emotions, it is clear how 
relevant could be its role in the experience of many “action-packed” movies able to 
elicit subcognitive or cognitively impenetrable responses,53 or in the studies on film 
immersion based on the perception of viewer’s presence in the diegetic world or on 
self-location in a virtual world.54 
ES updates and enhances simulation theories, by showing that the tracking 
process is shaped by motor programs and somato-sensory and interoceptive 
“representations” in bodily format activated in the observer.55 ES generates the 
Feeling of the Body that constitutes “a crucial ingredient of our relationship with 
fictional narratives.”56 The Feeling of the Body consists of the activation within the 
observer of non-linguistic “representations” of the body-states associated with the 
observed actions, emotions, and sensations, as if he or she were performing a similar 
action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. The Feeling of the Body, 
according to this hypothesis, would enable a direct access to the world of others by 
means of the ES-mediated capacity to share the meaning of actions, basic motor 
intentions, feelings, and emotions with others, thus grounding our identification 
with and connectedness to others. Intersubjectivity should thus be viewed first and 
foremost as intercorporeality. Simulation appears more and more essential to the 
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understanding of how we represent ourselves through art, and MMs could be 
recognized as the first agents of this kind of embodied cognition.57 Also simulation 
theories, conceived within the range of action of ES, play a role in our 
understanding of the nature of what we feel and we believe in aesthetic experience 
and obviously in film experience.  
The embodied side of the “as if” response in relation to fiction relies on this 
kind of simulation and allows us to reconsider the debate on the impression of 
reality films elicit and on the real nature of our reactions.58 Coleridge’s well-known 
“willing suspension of disbelief,” that has had a powerful afterlife in film studies, 
has gone through a big crisis in the period we are referring to: we read new 
proposals about the necessity for the viewer actively constructing disbelief in order 
to cope with what Richard Gerrig described as “anomalous suspense,”59 or about 
the necessity of emphatically applying our disbeliefs in order to inhibit the default 
“realistic” answer of our perceptual system.60 Some interesting contributions have 
tried to update such a concept, rethinking it within a Winnicottian perspective, or 
trying to give it a more scientific basis.61 The central question is still the reality effect: 
why, being aware of our condition of spectators inside a dark movie theatre, are we 
victims of the anomalous suspense a movie elicits? And why do we experience the 
same feeling even when we see this movie for the second or third time? David 
Bordwell tries to answer such a question in a very intriguing way: “a great deal of 
what contributes to suspense in films derives from low-level, modular processes. 
They are cognitively impenetrable, and that creates a firewall between them and 
what we remember from previous viewing.”62 According to Bordwell, the resonance 
effect that, for instance, mirror neurons are able to create in the viewer would play a 
key role in this kind of pre-cognitive contact, and as we know movies are well suited 
to produce mirroring processes.63 Bordwell’s “firewall hypothesis” is in line with 
recent researches on the vestibular system in film, according to which “though it is 
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true that we can, to some extent, use our cognition to unwire our experience of a 
film (by using belief/disbelief mechanism, for instance), and switch to a mere 
intellectual (high order) experience, there are, however, limits to how much control 
we can exert over the low level sensory experience offered by a film.”64 
However, such classical theories as Radford’s paradox of emotional response to 
fiction, or the so-called “pretend theory” and “thought theory” are challenged by 
the new insights cognitive neuroscience puts forward and particularly by ES. ES 
posits an on-line relation between the observer and the observed, anticipating, 
complementing and giving a neural basis to Currie’s off-line running of our mental 
processes. His Simulation Hypothesis has had a huge impact on cognitive film 
studies, although it neglects the physical impact of film on the viewer. We are not 
alone in wishing for an intervention by Currie in this debate, maybe focusing on the 
contribution of MMs.65 Currie says that one reason we can run our mental states off-
line is to engage with fictional world,66 but we have already observed how 
important it is to complement such an interpretation with a study of our bodily 
representation of this fictional world. Referring to our sensory-derived experience of 
the world, to the way we “manipulate” it with our brain, and to Sue Cataldi’s work 
on embodiment, Rurtherford focuses on the meaningful relation the film viewer 
establishes with filmic environment and what such environment offers,67 sharing 
actions and intentions.    
All the literature on embodied, tactile, visceral, haptic and “full resonance-like” 
aspects of film is strongly animated by the idea that there is a true link between us 
and the movies, and — through ES — we can grasp the truth of this getting back to 
our brain-body system and the way it engages with the real world. Scholars like 
Shaviro, Sobchack, Barker, Marks and others can subscribe that “what we take to be 
true in a situation depends on our embodied understanding of the situation”:68 
given the film as a situation, this is true for our “embodied visions” as well. The 
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reality status of film has its base here, via the affordances this fictional world offers 
to our brain-body and this is also the reason why neuroscientists like Damasio insist 
in comparing the movie to consciousness, affirming that whoever invented cinema 
might have thought, more or less consciously, of the function of the brain.69  
Obviously ES does not deceive us, nor weaken the “as if” component; on the 
contrary it can to some extent strengthen such a component, over-riding both the 
suspension of disbelief and the dynamics of the so-called “segregation of the 
spaces.” In other words, in aesthetic experience we are temporarily free from our 
real life occupations and we have the chance to liberate new energies to cope with 
a dimension paradoxically more vivid than reality. We can describe this attitude, 
more than as a suspension of disbelief, as a “liberated ES,” keeping us at a safe 
distance from the film and at the same time increasing the intensity of our relation 
to it.70 When watching a movie, our embodied simulation becomes liberated 
because it is freed from the burden of modeling our actual presence in daily life. 
We find ourselves situated at a safe distance from what is being narrated on the 
screen and this magnifies our receptivity. Through an immersive state in which 
our attention is entirely focused on the narrated filmic world, we can fully deploy 
our simulative resources, letting our defensive guard against daily reality slip for a 
while. 
Another important element of liberated simulation consists in the fact that 
when we watch a movie, we do it almost completely still. While sitting in a movie 
theater our interactions with the world are almost exclusively mediated by a 
simulative perception of the events, actions, and emotions portrayed in the movie.  
A sort of emotional transfer takes place between actors and spectators that, being 
forced to inaction, are more open to feelings and emotions.71 When watching a 
movie we not only entirely focus our attention on it, but our stillness simultaneously 
enables us to deploy fully our embodied simulation resources at the service of our 
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immersive relationship with the narrated characters.72 Also this would be a good 
way to describe the difference between a mental state relying on our “aesthetic 
attitude” and another relying on “ordinary” consciousness.73  
 
 
4. Sharing behaviors 
 
Movies are basically action-based and action-packed. The movement normally 
implies a story developed in space and time and a goal to be reached. What we 
assume is that this kind of elementary structure contacts us at a pre-verbal level 
rooted in ES. In other words we must share attitudes and behaviors with what 
happens on the screen in order to enter that space. Both our beliefs and our ability to 
infer the meaning of the action we stare at depend on the “we-centric space”74 
enabled by the activation of the shared brain circuits characterizing ES. When we 
watch a movie we are compelled to privilege the space in front of us, moving in the 
direction our eyes look at.75 
At its very beginning cinema embodied a form of modernity shaped by 
sensation and by a new ability to empathize with a virtual and self-moving 
environment. In the early phase of film, the body had a huge importance as a 
stimulus, and many movies within the so-called “cinema of attractions” were 
animated by the desire to address directly the audience by means of the body, 
emphasizing gestures, facial expressions, or recurring to some styilistic solutions 
such as for instance eye-contact. Referring to James Mark Baldwin’s social 
psychology, Auerbach describes early cinema as the “very scene of corporeal self-
objectification.”76 
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The human body was an element of continuity capable of filling the emptiness 
of narrative structures and film style, and of making the viewer able to move 
through a new spatial dimension felt to be part of our peri-personal space, 
according to Lumière’s main goal: placing the world within one’s reach (zu-handen). 
As Singer puts it, cinema was grounded in “a neurological conception of 
modernity”77, that is, in a strong tendency to sensationalism that we can also detect 
nowadays in many 3D or CGI (Computer Generated Imagery) movies.78  
The main goal is to affect the viewer with a new kind of moving image, 
considering it within a sensory-motor perspective. In one of his early writings, 
referring to Lipps, Eisenstein wrote that “because emotional perception is achieved 
through the motor reproduction of the movements of the actor by the perceiver, this 
kind of reproduction can only be caused by movement that adheres to the methods 
that it normally adheres to in nature.”79 Eisenstein seems to be very close to the ES 
perspective, but he also sees that film art cannot stop at the body level: the 
filmmaker has to shift the affect from the body to the language (body) of film, 
transferring the principles of biomechanics from the actor’s body to film’s body, 
becoming a sort of “psycho-engineer” (psicho-inžener)80 who considers the montage 
as the universal method for “vitalizing human qualities.”81     
Viewers’ film experience can vary depending on the quality of film inputs: the 
acting represents a first stage of embodiment that allows the audience to be on-line 
not only in respect to its viewing processes, but also to action and tactility. The 
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acting body is the first form of embodiment, and film style arises from a negotiation 
with it. Film style could be the result of a fragmentation of our corporeal relation to 
the world (Soviet montage), a simulation of body’s movements, displayed emotions 
and sensations within the movie as a “fully realized world”82 (classical Hollywood 
film), or a neutralization of the action capable of immobilizing the character within 
his environment, contrasting the transparency of film language and offering a 
metareflection on film (modern cinema). 
These cases, characterizing the abovementioned different phases of film history 
entail various sets of spectators’ beliefs rooted in different cognitive and pre-
cognitive domains. In the vast majority of cases the viewer feels the camera as her 
own body — capable of walking and making gestures —, and the movie as a sort of 
strange out-of-body experience: according to Barker, “when viewers and films share 
certain attitudes, tasks, or situations, they will move in similar ways.”83 
Sharing attitudes and behaviors means grasping the action potentiality of a 
movie, on which much part of its make-believe cues relies. ES could represent an 
interesting way of reconsidering the history of film style on a motor and 
enteroceptive basis, considering it both from the filmmaker’s perspective and from 
the viewer’s one. When a movie gives up its goal-orientation or its action potential, 
as in the case of 1960s new waves, we have to share other attitudes, wondering 
about director’s hidden intentions and feeling a bit excluded from its environment. 
The degrees of ES could be an index useful to evaluate our cognition in film 
experience, and to test the “salience” of a film sequence84 and the limits of our 
beliefs.  
In the final part of our paper we analyze two important sequences of two very 
different movies: one from Hitchock’s Notorious (1946) and one from Antonioni’s Il 
grido (1957), two good examples of identification and disidentification with 
character’s actions, motor intentions, feelings and emotions. These two sequences 
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are characterized by the same stylistic solution – a false point-of-view (FPOV) shot – 
one that causes totally different embodied attitudes. 
 
4.1. Notorious: To Grasp or Not to Grasp 
According to Truffaut, “Notorious is the very quintessence of Hitchcock,” while 
Krohn entitled the chapter on it “Writing with the camera.”85 From our perspective 
Notorious is a brilliant example of the classical period and a good model to test the 
value of an ES approach to film analysis. In the last part of The Movement-Image, 
Deleuze describes Hitchcock as the father of a new kind of image, the relation-
image: “each image in its frame, by its frame, must exhibit a mental relation.” This 
relation is to some extent encoded by the camera movement: “The characters can 
eat, perceive, experience, but they cannot testify the relations which determine 
them. These are merely the movements of the camera, and their movements towards 
the camera.”86 According to Deleuze, Hitchcock incorporates the viewer’s responses 
into film style and language, and he is interested in triggering those responses by 
means of the camera behavior more than by means of the characters’ psychology. In 
other words Hitchcock aims to contact the viewer at a pre-cognitive level exploiting 
the potentiality of camera movements, and promoting an embodied approach 
capable of enhancing the suspense effect: before sharing the experiences of the 
characters, the viewer shares the experiences of the camera.  
The well-known sequence of the key in Notorious is usually mentioned for the 
extraordinary scene in which the camera, mounted on a crane, sees a wide-angle 
shot of the party and then glides in to an extreme close-up of the key clenched in 
Alicia’s hand. Nonetheless we would like to recall here the preceding scene. Alicia is 
going to enter Sebastian’s room to steal the key of the cellar: Hitchcock lets Alicia 
walk toward the camera waiting for her close-up on the room threshold. Alicia sees 
Sebastian’s shadow reflected on his bathroom door. The keys are on his desk. 
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The camera gets close to the desk in order to grasp the keys. The viewer 
interprets this tracking shot as Alicia’s POV shot. Hitchcock expresses very well the 
character’s goal by simulating its accomplishment with a very common stylistic 
solution. The action potentiality of the camera is perfectly embodied by the tracking 
shot, sharing Alicia’s motor intentions, feelings and emotion. 
 
 
 
The viewer is almost ready to grasp the keys, as in a well-done grasping 
experiment, but Hitchcock decides to frustrate her potential — and almost 
accomplished — action by showing in the following shot Alicia still on the 
threshold. The woman, after having evaluated the risks of her action, decides to 
approach the desk and to grasp the keys: from a stylistic point of view, the structure 
of the scene is circular, it begins and ends in the same way, just observing Alicia 
walking in Sebastian’s house. 
In our opinion this sequence exemplifies how the tracking shot mimicks not 
only Alicia’s potential approach to the keys, but also, by means of ES, the viewer’s 
own potential approach, which turns into a grasping simulation the more the keys 
are made ready-to-hand, thus evoking the activation of the viewer’s canonical 
neurons. Two distinct simulation processes can be envisaged. By embodying camera 
movements of the tracking shot, the viewer simulates approaching to the table. This 
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simulation brings the keys on the table within the observer’s simulated peri-
personal space, thus turning them into potentially graspable objects, thanks to the 
ensuing grasping simulation triggered by the activation of the viewer’s canonical 
neurons. Once the viewer realize Alicia is still standing by the room threshold, 
suspense gets enhanced because it turns out that the previous tracking shot only 
simulated Alicia’s intention to get the keys, and she still has to accomplish her goal 
at risk of being caught by Sebastian. 
An ES-based analysis of Hitchcock’s film style could implement the study of 
some of the most relevant techniques suitable for making the viewer part of the 
story. At the same time, such an approach is in line with recent attempts to describe 
Hitchcock’s film narrative from an embodied perspective.87 
 
4.2. Il grido: Thinking up a Movie by Staring at a Wall 
Il grido represents a crucial point in Antonioni’s filmography, since it anticipates the 
most recognizable and original stylistic solutions that the Italian director will employ 
in the tetralogy formed by L’avventura, La notte, L’eclisse, and Il deserto rosso. Aldo’s 
floating off in the Po Valley landscape gives Antonioni a chance to reflect on the 
separation of human beings from reality, shaped by an interruption of their sensory-
motor relationship. Aldo is not able to interact with the environment, nor with the 
other human beings, he is condemned to walk through a space-time he cannot share 
with anyone. Film style is strongly influenced by this kind of disembodied behavior, 
and Antonioni decides to contrast the myth of transparency making the viewer aware 
of the artificial dimension of the camera and heightening the discrepancy between 
film and reality. Antonioni discusses both the classical film transparency and the 
transparency of our conscious experience of the world.88 Like Aldo who has no control 
over his environment, viewers feels they have no control over the fictitious world, and 
— as Grodal writes — “this elicits strong subjective feelings which also reflect that the 
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experience is disembodied”:89 the viewer experiences a lack of control of vision. As we 
can read in the film treatment, Aldo is not conscious of his body’s behavior.90  
Antonioni gets this effect by giving up the POV shot and the shot/reverse shot 
technique. On the one hand he aims to distort the visual relationship between the 
viewer and the object of her gaze; on the other hand he aims to refuse the reciprocity 
between individuals.91 There is no space for action in Antonioni’s world, as Zernik 
wrote “le monde est distant, comme ‘à travers une vitre’.”92 This effect is very 
detectable if we analyze the sequence of the sugar refinery tower, that we find at the 
beginning and at the end of Il grido. 
An extreme high angle shot shows us a worker calling Aldo, since Irma is 
looking for him. The worker stares at the camera and we interpret the shot as Aldo’s 
POV shot. Suddenly Aldo bursts into the shot from the left side and makes the 
viewer aware that it is a FPOV shot — now an over-the-shoulder shot — revealing 
that there is another gaze regulating the relationship between the characters. 
The same solution characterizes the following shots: Irma looks for Aldo, we see 
her from Aldo’s FPOV shot — still believing in the POV shot — then the man enters 
the shot. 
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The following shot — organized in a chiastic structure — shows Irma who 
brings to Aldo his packed lunch. Aldo starts going downstairs, but the POV does 
not change, revealing the presence of a metaphysical gaze.  
The same structure is repeated at the end of the movie, preparing for Aldo’s 
death. The contact between Irma and Aldo seems to be impossible; Chatman 
observes that “Aldo’s fall is rather the accidental consequence of a movement of 
yearning toward Irma, the only woman who could ever satisfy him.”93 Aldo’s death 
could be the punishment for trying to get out from the entrapment Antonioni’s 
camera has created. After Aldo’s death, Antonioni gets back to the tower, offering 
for the last time his “absurd” POV shot.  
 
 
 
The refusal of the POV shot and the absence of any reverse angle shot impair 
the viewer’s ability to project herself on the movie, to share attitudes and behaviors 
with the characters, to empathize with the environment. Recalling what Deleuze 
wrote on Hitchcock, we can affirm that the camera much more than the characters 
determines the relations within the movie: we could easily describe Hitchcock’s 
cinema as a cinema of affordance, while Antonioni builds cinematic walls between 
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the viewer and the movie, impairing movement and projection, and reflecting on 
the cinematic attitude to deny and at the same time to reproduce reality. According 
to Joseph Anderson’s assumptions on “orientational relationships” in the movie, we 
can see how “the sense of these combinations of shots depends in large part upon 
the viewer’s correct recognition of the physical orientation of the characters to each 
other and to their environment.”94 
To quote Chatman for the last time, we can verify this by realizing that Aldo 
“cannot move into dimension, into depth”:95 this idea of a “blocked vision” was 
expressed by Antonioni himself when he said that he thought up Il grido by staring 
at a wall.96 
The scene we chose from Il grido again exemplifies the relationship between 
film style and embodiment, although, this time, from a negative point of view. By 
disengaging the camera from the character’s body and by in so doing revealing a 
hidden dimension, the viewer is excluded from the diegetic world, becoming aware 
of the presence of a disembodied narrator. Summing up, while Hitchcock aims to 
fully exploit an embodied camera in order to violate viewers’ expectation, thus 
enhancing film suspense, Antonioni, by using the very same film technique (FPOV 
shot), puts viewers in a similar existential situation as the film’s characters. Aldo, in 
the same way as many other of Antonioni’s characters is detached from a 
disembodied world, and viewers share his condition by experiencing an inactive 
and enstranged relationship with the camera. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
ES provides a unitary account of basic forms of social cognition, showing that 
people re-use their own mental states or processes represented within a bodily 
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format in functionally attributing them to others. Because of a shared format of 
bodily representation, we map the actions of others onto our own motor 
representations, as well as others’ emotions and sensations onto our own viscero-
motor and sensory-motor representations. Movement, space, objects and action are 
crucial elements to be studied in order to see the film as a place of interaction and 
intersubjectivity. We propose that these elements are linked to the function of ES. 
We believe ES can enrich the philosophical debate within film studies both at 
the receptive level and at the creative one, by shedding new light on at least three 
types of embodiment related to cinema: i) film style as embodiment; ii) acting style 
as embodiment; iii) viewer’s responses to filmed bodies and objects as embodiment.  
We suggest that ES is able to have an impact on different film styles, adding a 
new perspective in the history of film styles. The connection between the camera, 
the characters, the objects on the screen and the viewer has to be studied from all 
angles. The different gazes the camera eye can convey (e.g., POV shots, over-the-
shoulder shots and FPOV shots) imply different levels of “resonance” in the viewer. 
Finally we believe that our embodied perspective can inform a new empirical 
investigation of both the creative and the receptive aspects of film.97 
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